D. Solution of the Question

64. From these results I argue briefly thus to the solution of the question: for the deletion of a mortal fault committed after baptism there is required voluntary punishment or a will for punishment; but neither of these can be without penitence;     therefore etc     . The proof of the first proposition is in the second article and at the beginning of this third article [nn.39-41]; the second is plain from the first part of this article [n.54].

65. And from this argument is it plain how the conclusion on which the solution to the question rests, namely that penitence is required for deletion of sin, should be understood etc. [n.40]; for it is only understood of actual penitence, that is, of an act of penitence, which is an actual ‘holding a penalty’ (so to speak); and the understanding is only about that act as indistinctly taken for any of the four descriptions stated before [nn.61-63]. But whether this act must be right or virtuous or not, or formed or not, is in the following question [nn.84-150].

66. The conclusion is also only understood of what is required simply necessarily (of which the opposite includes a contradiction), because God could remit sin without any act by him to whom he remits it. But neither is it necessarily required on the supposition of an act by the man to whom sin is remitted; for God could remit sin through some fervent act of love for God without any of the four previously stated acts in their proper idea - as in the case of an act of zeal for martyrdom that is at once to be undergone, where perhaps there would be no thought taken of any sin previously committed, nor consequently any aforesaid penitence; and this taken formally, though virtually in that motion there would be penitence in its second signification [sc. virtual, n.62].

67. And the proof of this is that no one is excluded from the Kingdom of Heaven who does what is simply necessary; but it is possible for someone who is in mortal sin up to instant a to be necessitated from instant a on to focus with his whole heart on acts distracting him for thinking of past sin, as his being at once exposed to the most straitened martyrdom.

68. And for this reason was it said in the conclusion that ‘[voluntary punishment] is as a rule required for deletion of sin’ [n.40], because that thing is said to happen ‘as a rule’ which happens according to rules determined by Divine Wisdom, of which this is one: that sin committed is not destroyed without displeasure at the sin committed. And this rule appears very reasonable, because just as sin turns one away from the end and toward creatures, so it is reasonable that it only be destroyed by an opposite motion turning one away from sin or from creatures (as being that which the sin was about) and toward God.

69. Now, to the part that is ‘to be displeased at sin committed’ [n.68] can be reduced the three other members of what it is to be penitent [sc. the second, third, and fourth descriptions in n.62].

70. But as to the special conditions about how an act of penitence is required for deletion of sin (whether as preceding or as concomitant disposition) - this will be plain in the following question [nn.130-132].